


Statistical Methods for Algorithmic Fairness in Risk Adjustment

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November 17, 2021

H

ECONOMICS

A

POLICY

OUTCOMES

H



“ Learning two fields takes, surprisingly, twice as long as learning one. But it’s worth the investment because you get to solve real problems for the first time. ”

Barbara Engelhardt | Princeton



“ In both private enterprise and the public sector, research must be reflective of the society we’re serving. ”

Rediet Abebe | Harvard & UC Berkeley



“ ...behind every data point there is a human story, there is a family, and there is suffering. ”

Nick Jewell | LSHTM & UC Berkeley

FAIRNESS

Who decides the research question?

Who is in the target population?

What do the data reflect?

How will the algorithm be assessed?

Who decides the research question?

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What do the data reflect?

How will the algorithm be assessed?

**Justice: benefits, risks, costs, and resources
are equitably distributed**

Ethical Pipeline

Problem Selection




Disparities in funding and problem selection priorities are an ethical violation of principles of justice.

Ethical Pipeline

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
Data Collection




Disparities in funding and problem selection priorities are an ethical violation of principles of justice.

Focus on convenience samples can exacerbate existing disparities in marginalized and underserved populations, violating do-no-harm principles.


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
Ethical Pipeline



Ethical Pipeline



Ethical Pipeline



Irene Chen
PhD Student
MIT



Ethical Machine Learning in Healthcare

Annual Review of Biomedical Data Science

Vol. 4:123-144 (Volume publication date July 2021)

Irene Y. Chen, Emma Pierson, Sherri Rose, Shalmali Joshi, Kadija Ferryman, and Marzyeh Ghassemi

Plan Payment Risk Adjustment

Over 50 million people in the United States currently enrolled in an insurance program that uses risk adjustment

- ▶ Redistribute funds based on health
- ▶ Encourage competition based on efficiency and quality
- ▶ Massive financial implications



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Spending outcome

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Input vector

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
Coefficient vector

Input vector



Variable Selection and Upcoding

Reduced set of 10 variables 92% as efficient




A Machine Learning Framework for
Plan Payment Risk Adjustment

Sherri Rose



Variable Selection and Upcoding

~~Reduced set of 10 variables 92% as efficient~~



“...results for the risk adjustment algorithms that considered a limited subset of variables...performed consistently worse across all benchmarks.”

Sample Selection for Medicare Risk Adjustment Due to Systematically Missing Data

Savannah L. Bergquist , *Thomas G. McGuire*,
Timothy J. Layton , and *Sherri Rose* 



A Machine Learning Framework for Plan Payment Risk Adjustment


Sherri Rose



Improving Mental Health Care, 1950-2000

Changes in financing and organization of mental health care, not new treatment technologies, made the difference

“Improvements ... evolved through ... more money, greater consumer choice, and the increased competition among ... providers that these forces unleashed”



Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders (MHSUD)

Risk adjustment in the Marketplaces
recognizes only 20% of enrollees with MHSUD

Individuals with MHSUD can be **systematically discriminated** against

By Ellen Montz, Tim Layton, Alisa B. Busch, Randall P. Ellis, Sherri Rose, and Thomas G. McGuire

**Risk-Adjustment Simulation: Plans
May Have Incentives To Distort
Mental Health And Substance Use
Coverage**



Fairness Methodology



Fairness Methodology



Data transformations

Fairness Methodology



Adding variables, separate formulas, statistical learning

Fairness Methodology



Differing thresholds

Algorithmic Fairness

Typical algorithmic fairness problem in computer science has

- ▶ outcome Y
- ▶ vector X that includes a protected class or sensitive attribute $A \subset X$

Goal:

Create estimator for $f(X) = Y$ while ensuring the function is fair for A

Common measures of fairness are based on the notion of **group fairness**, striving for similarity in predicted outcomes or errors for groups

Algorithmic Fairness


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
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Global vs. Group Fit Metrics

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum_k (Y_k - \hat{Y}_k)^2}{\sum_k (Y_k - \bar{Y}_k)^2}$$

- ▶ \hat{Y} is predicted spending
- ▶ \bar{Y} is mean spending

Global vs. Group Fit Metrics

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum_k (Y_k - \hat{Y}_k)^2}{\sum_k (Y_k - \bar{Y}_k)^2}$$

Health Economics

Net Compensation

(Layton et al. 2017)

$$\frac{1}{n_g} \sum_{i \in g} (\hat{Y}_i - Y_i)$$

Global vs. Group Fit Metrics

	R^2	MHSUD Net Compensation
1. baseline formula	13.1%	-\$2,822


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	2% increase	31% increase
2. + mental health	13.3%	-\$1,952

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1. baseline formula	13.1%	-\$2,822
↓	2% increase	31% increase
2. + mental health	13.3%	-\$1,952
↓	No change	11% increase
3. + substance use	13.3%	-\$1,731
↓	No change	2% decrease
4a. - liver conditions	13.3%	-\$1,763

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Computer Science & Statistics

Mean Residual Difference

(Calders et al. 2013)

$$\frac{1}{n_g} \sum_{i \in g} (\hat{Y}_i - Y_i) - \frac{1}{n_c} \sum_{j \in g^c} (\hat{Y}_j - Y_j)$$

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Predictive Ratios

(Pope et al. 2004)

$$\frac{\sum_{i \in g} \hat{Y}_i}{\sum_{i \in g} Y_i}$$

Computer Science & Statistics

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**Can we improve fairness for undercompensated groups
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Identifying complex groups defined by multiple attributes

Anna Zink
PhD Student
Harvard



1 Covariance Regression

Covariance techniques require covariance between the residual and protected class be close to zero (Zafar et al. 2017a,b)

We extend these methods for **continuous residuals** with continuous Y . The new optimization problem is given by:

$$\text{minimize}_{\theta} \left\{ \sum_k \left(Y_k - \sum_p \theta_p X_{kp} \right)^2 \right\}, \text{ subject to}$$

$$(1 - P(A = 1)) \sum_{i \in g} \left(Y_i - \sum_p \theta_p X_{ip} \right) - P(A = 1) \sum_{j \in g^c} \left(Y_j - \sum_p \theta_p X_{jp} \right) < c,$$

where $c = m \times c^*$ with $m \in [0, 1]$ and c^* the covariance of the undercompensated group and OLS residual

1 Net Compensation Regression

Propose new custom penalty term that punishes large net compensation

Our minimization problem:

$$\sum_k \left(Y_k - \sum_p \theta_p X_{kp} \right)^2 + \lambda \left(\frac{1}{n_g} \sum_{i \in g} \left(Y_i - \sum_p \theta_p X_{ip} \right) \right)$$

1 Net Compensation Regression

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Can alternatively present our new method as a constraint:

$$\text{minimize}_{\theta} \left\{ \sum_k \left(Y_k - \sum_p \theta_p X_{kp} \right)^2 \right\}, \text{ subject to}$$
$$\frac{1}{n_g} \sum_{i \in g} \left(Y_i - \sum_p \theta_p X_{ip} \right) \leq z,$$

where z is positive, 1-to-1 correspondence with λ when constraint is binding

1 Large Gains in Group Fairness vs. OLS

Regression Method	R^2	MHSUD Net Compensation
Average	12.4%	
Covariance	12.4	
Net Compensation	12.5	
Weighted Average	12.6	
Mean Residual Difference	12.8	
Ordinary Least Squares	12.9	




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Fair regression for health care spending

Anna Zink, Sherri Rose

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
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1 Large Gains in Group Fairness vs. OLS

Regression Method	R^2	MHSUD Net Compensation
Average	12.4%	-\$46
Covariance	12.4	-46
Net Compensation	12.5	-232
Weighted Average	12.6	-411
Mean Residual Difference	12.8	-1208
Ordinary Least Squares	12.9	-1872




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
2 Multiple Groups

Improving the Performance of Risk Adjustment Systems: Constrained Regressions, Reinsurance, and Variable Selection


Thomas G. McGuire, Anna L. Zink and Sherri Rose



3 Complex Groups




3 Complex Groups



Example Hypothetical Group



3 Complex Groups




Example Hypothetical Group



AGE 55
to 59

3 Complex Groups




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
AGE 55
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Undercompensated?



3 Complex Groups



Identifying undercompensated groups defined by multiple attributes in risk adjustment

Anna Zink, Sherri Rose

BMJ Health & Care Informatics

IN CLOSING

Biases enter data & algorithms in many ways

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Diverse teams

Biases enter data & algorithms in many ways

Diverse teams

Metricsu matter

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Not as simple as add or drop attribute

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Respect the data

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Engage with the application or do not use it

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Cite the literature

Does Your Algorithm Have a Social Impact Statement?

Responsibility

Explainability

Accuracy

Auditability

Fairness

**If you don't meet people
like you in your courses
or see yourself in your
instructors, that doesn't
mean you don't belong
in this field**

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MGH/Harvard



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Purdue




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Anna Zink
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Paldamoyo Chapfuwa, PhD
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Samson Mataraso
Stanford



Checo Gonzales
Stanford

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